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SOME ASPECTS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND FEDERALISM*
THOMAS REED PowmL
[An Address Delivered Before the North Carolina Bar Association on
August 20, 1935]
Mr. Chairnu, Members and Guests of the North Carolina Bar
Association:
The charming, alluring, much appreciated and eagerly accepted invitation of your President was waiting for me at my summer home on
the New York shore of Lake Champlain on the eve of July 4th upon
my return from a day of motoring in my native state of Vermont. The
Lake which once was a highway between the two states is now in the
days of motors a barrier, but at Crown Point we cross on a bridge
maintained by the two states jointly. The annual tolls are several times
the amount that Vermont paid to New York in atonement for the ruthless and successful resistance of the Green Mountain Boys to sovereign
powers which New York sought in vain to exercise over what had been
the New Hampshire Grants. My native state would have been New
Hampshire, had not the British Government transferred the territory
to New York in 1764. My native state would have been New York,
had not New York behaved so wantonly about prior New Hampshire
grants that the grantees took it upon themselves to establish and maintain their independence.
The ortholexy of Vermont's action is as open to question as was that
of New York. If such issues are still open for consideration, one may
even ask questions about what happened in Philadelphia on July 4th,
1776, little as some be-buttoned and be-pinned Sons and Daughters seem
inclined to do so. To Vermont, though still without the fold of the
inchoate union, the Declaration of Independence was not only a for* This paper was written in a shack in the woods where library facilities were
meagre. Some recent Supreme Court reports, some ancient records of Vermont
history and some printed perpetrations of my own were about all that was available to make for that accuracy which is a requisite of scholarship. The form of
expression was motivated by the anticipation of oral delivery rather than by the
canons of a formal law-review article. In complying with the request for lawreview publication it has seemed to me best to leave the text as originally written
and to add retroactively in footnotes such corrections, qualifications and citations
as autumnal reflection and the facilities of a law library suggest and supply. Chasing down references and citations is not in itself a thrilling chore, but the tedium
is alleviated by its refreshing of the grateful recollection of a happy and stimulating week in the goodly fellowship of the glorious company on the cruise of
the North Carolina Bar Association on board the good ship "Reliance" in August,

1935.
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ward-looking document but a backward-looking one as well. To make
the past secure and the future free, she resolved as follows:
"Wherews, the Honorable and Continental Congress did, on the 4th
day of July last, declare the United Colonies in America to be free and
independent of the crown of Great Britain; which declaration we most
cordially acquiesce in; and whereas by the said declaration the arbitrary
acts of the crown are null and void, in America, consequently the jurisdiction by said crown granted to New York government over the people
of New-Hampshire Grants is totally dissolved;
"We therefore.... ,
A lawyer who by the aid of his familiarity with nunc pro tunc and with
trespass ab initio can accept Vermont's premise must naturally anticipate the conclusion that the jurisdiction of New Hampshire was thereupon retroactively restored. Not so the Vermonters. For what follows
is this:
"We therefore, the inhabitants, on said tract of land, are at present
without law or government, and may be truly said to be in a state of
nature; consequently a right remains to the people of said grants to
form a government
best suited to secure their property, well being and
'2
happiness.
This is prophetic of Calhoun, or at least of the Hartford Convention.
So perhaps without offensive or undue pride, a Yankee, with or without
a prefatory adjective, may point out the debt of the South to Vermont
and to New England for example and for justification.
Facts are more important than theories, and the fact is that Vermont acted as an independent nation from 1777 to 1791. She fought
at Ticonderoga, Hubbardton and Bennington, but she also pursued negotiations with the British commander in Montreal which resulted in staving off a British invasion during a season when the pen and tongue
proved mighty though the sword was weak. Yet I would not have you
think that Vermonters are characteristically strong in speech. A profusion of verbal reserve has been thought to be a trait of one of the
later Green Mountain boys who attained a high place in the nation. This
was not learned from Ethan Allen, nor from George Harvey or John
Barrett, but it was not unknown even in early days. Several months
before Vermont formally adopted her Declaration of Independence from
New York, she voted to prepare the public mind to receive it. Here
are the stirring tones of the resolution:
"That a Manifesto be put in the public newspapers setting forth the
reasons, in easy terms, why we choose not to connect with New-York."
Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of
Vermont,
vol. 1, p.51.
8
2
Id. at 38.
Ibid.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FEDERALISM
Before we leave the subject of secession, mention must be made of
the most successful one, of which North Carolina for a year or so was
one of the victims. This was the secession of Delaware, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South
Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia and New York from the Government of the United States under the Articles of Confederation. The
Articles provided that the Union should be perpetual and that no change
should be made except by the vote of Congress and the ratification of
the legislatures of all the thirteen states. Such cumbersome procedure
did not suit the Founding Fathers. They preferred ratification by conventions, rather than by legislatures, by nine of the states rather than
by thirteen. And so it came about that North Carolina and Rhode
Island were left alone for a season as the only truly legal United States
of America, until they too joined in our second Revolution and became
a part of the new federation under the new Constitution of the United
States. Facts again are more important than theories, and the Constitution has long since put off its unconstitutionality and become a recognized foundation of'the government under which we live.
This brief reminder of happenings in backgrounds dear to you and
me may suggest that the evolution of government does not follow the
rigid process of strict law. Other examples are afforded by the creation
of the State of West Virginia and by the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Lawyers proficient in searching titles would need to mellow their canons of authenticity before giving a warranty deed after
making an abstract of constitutional grants and conveyances. Lawyers
skilled in the drafting and interpretation of deeds and wills would be
hard put to it to tell the meaning of our Constitution by reading its
articles and sections. They might from such reading even be unaware
that there is a place to go for information about this meaning. For the
Constitution does not say that it shall mean what the Supreme Court
shall say that it shall mean. This was left to inference, and the great
decision of Marbury v. Madison4 makes the inference easy only by assuming that the issue of constitutionality is capable of an objective
answer if made by a court and that for judges the comparison of statute
and constitution is as simple as the housewife's matching of colors.
The present Chief Justice of the United States knew better when he
was Governor of the State of New York. I may quote inaccurately,
for I am away from my books, but in substance he said: "We are living
'1 Cranch 137, 2 L. ed. 60 (U. S. 1803).
[Ed. Note: It is the policy of this publication to cite the volume of the official
United States Reports, rather than the named reporters. However, out of deference to the author's preference for the latter form, an exception is made herein.]

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."
Again I may quote inaccurately from Bishop Hoadley who back in the
early eighteenth century said something like this: "Whoso hath final
power to interpret any written or spoken laws, he it is who is in truth
the lawgiver, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."0 I
may be inaccurate in quotation, but I am not inaccurate if I say the same
things myself,-or at least not wholly inaccurate. Of course general
statements like this may tend to over-emphasize one of the several or
many factors in the process of judicial interpretation. That there are
various factors in the judicial process is charmingly told in Mr. Justice
Cardozo's lectures on the nature of that process.7 The inevitable presence of several factors inevitably involves the necessity of judicial choice.
When judges choose, it is the judges who choose, and neither statute
nor precedent nor Constitution can do the choosing for them. Even
those who choose the judges can not choose how they shall choose, as
the elder Roosevelt learned from Mr. Justice Holmes.
This incident of Roosevelt's explosion at Holmes's dissent in the
Northern Securities Case is enough to make one leery about any suggestion to pack a bench to get the kind of constitutional law one may at the
moment want. Who can know well enough the hidden springs of human
action and human attitude even in intimate and life-long friends to be
' The correct quotation is: "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution
is what the judges say it is, . . ." The statement was made in the course of an
extemporaneous speech before the Elmira (New York) Chamber of Commerce on

May 3, 1907, and was in a paragraph directed against the position that there should
be judicial review of matters of administrative detail in connection with utility
regulation. This paragraph reads as follows:
"I have the highest regard for the courts. My whole life has been spent in
work conditioned upon respect for the courts. I reckon him one of the worst
enemies of the community who will talk lightly of the dignity of the bench. We
are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and
the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the Constitution. I do not want to see any direct assault upon the courts, nor do I want
to see any indirect assault upon the courts. And I tell you, ladies and gentlemen,
no more insidious assault could 'be made upon the independence and esteem of the
judiciary than to burden it with these questions of administration,-questions which
lie close to the public impatience, and in regard to which the people are going to
insist on having administration by officers directly accountable to them." AD-

DRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (Ist ed. 1908) 139-140; (2nd ed.

1916)
185-186.
6
James B. Thayer in The Origh and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law (1893) 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, at 132, gives the reference to a sermon by Bishop Hoadly on "The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ,"
published in London by James Knapton in 1717, and quotes the sentence as follows: "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken
laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver, to all intents and purposes, and not the
person who first wrote or spoke of them." Mr. Thayer derived the quotation from
John C. Gray, who derived it from Mr. Justice Holmes. See Gray, Some Deftnitions and Questions in Turisprudence (1892) 6 HARV. L. REV. 21, at 33, n. 1.
The two quoters differ slightly in their quotations and in their spelling of the
good Bishop's name. Mr. Thayer apparently went to the original source.
'CAMozo, THaE NATURE OF THE JUDIClAI, PROCESS (1925).
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competent to forecast judicial behavior on varied specific issues? Who
can know how long the issues of the moment will remain the issues of
the nation? One may search in prospective judges for qualities of insight and power, for real gifts of reason and wisdom and statesmanship,
and one may perhaps find what one is looking for, as I for one believe
that President Hoover was reluctantly compelled to find in Mr. Justice
Cardozo, but if one goes about with a candle or a lantern searching for
a rubber stamp, the search may be rewarded by a stamp that other hands
will soon find the way to press.
It is hard enough to pick a really excellent judge when the picking
is confined to one at a time. Unhappily there is no established tradition
or available machinery for getting the sense of the bar or of the nation
on the most desirable persons to be considered for membership on the
Supreme Court of the United States. In some of our states the situation
is better, though the results may not be commensurate with the opportunity. So long as the American Bar Association continues its present
practice in picking its presidents, I would not recommend that it be consulted about possibilities for the more important post of Supreme Court
Justice. Yet something better than the sort of chance that now operates
would be desirable. Only once in a while does the appointment of a
Chief Justice or an Associate Justice go to one whom the gentlemen of
the ring would call a "natural." Of the present bench only the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Cardozo fall easily within that class. The other
appointments depended greatly upon who was the picker at the moment.
This is not to belittle the results, but only to point to an obvious fact.
It was the unrivalled distinction of Holmes that created the void
that inexorably called for Cardozo. I have seen the same situation on
law faculties. When a retirement has left a small hole, there is danger
that the choice of a successor will content itself with a man that is about
big enough to match the hole. When real distinction has been lost, there
is likely to be a more determined impulse to replace it. It is well to
remind ourselves that a small hole offers as big an opportunity as a large
one, and that the smaller the hole the more joyous the opportunity. After
we have thus reminded ourselves, we should pass the reminder on to
the President and the Senators. There are some sad instances in which
individual Senators have with the aid of so-called Senatorial courtesy
dictated to a President the appointment of inferior federal judges who
all too well live down to that designation. In such matters the local
and state bar associations have a significant opportunity to play an important part. If they should develop a tradition of insisting on the
highest possible calibre of men for the lowest rung of the federal judicial

6
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ladder, we might hope for a group of trained and experienced judges in
which there would be several who would stand out as "naturals" whenever there is a vacancy on the highest court of the land.
We are living under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is. This is always forced into the limelight when the judges
are divided. There was a time in the Chief Justiceship of Mr. White
when on a type of important issues the bench was divided into three
equal camps. On one side were certain to be the Chief Justice and Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds. On the other side were certain
to be Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke. The cases were decided by
the odd man of Justices McKenna, Day and Pitney. In those days I
knew a little constitutional law, in the sense of what Mr. Justice Holmes
calls a prophecy of what courts will do in fact. When that bench was
transformed, my constitutional law evaporated for a time. Later I became competent again. On one side were Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler. On the opposite side were surely
Justices Holmes and Brandeis and progressively surely Mr. Justice
Stone. In between were Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Mr. Justice Sanford, with the Chief Justice, as he grew older, more definitely aligning
himself with the four whom for convenience of later reference I may
call the Stalwarts.
In the latter days of the Taft court, a determined Stalwart majority
went to new lengths in curbing the governmental powers of police and
of taxation. Long established and judicially sanctioned powers of taxation were brought to an end, sometimes by explicit over-ruling,8 sometimes by distinctions so tenuous9 that one was compelled to suspect
either the capacity or the candor of the distinguishers. On issues that
from a technical lawyer's standpoint differed widely, there was the same
or nearly the same division in case after case. LO In the realm of police
power the judicial mesh was woven so tight that little that was new or
far-reaching got through. By contrast with anything that had happened
in any earlier comparable period, it is fair to say that the power of
"See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 209, 50 Sup.
Ct. 98, 99, 74 L. ed. 371, 374 (1930), explicitly overruling Blackstone v. Miller,
1889U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1903).
See Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed.
874 (1929). I have discussed these distinctions in The Macallen Case-and Before (1930) 8 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 47; The Macallen Case-and Beyond (1930)
8 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 91; and in An Imaginary Judicial Opinion (1931) 44
HARv. L. REv. 889.
10From 1925 to 1930 there were about 25 cases in which Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone were together in dissent, and some 12 cases in which Justices
Holmes and Brandeis dissented without being joined by Mr. Justice Stone. These
dissenters were joined by Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Justices Sutherland and
Butler in one case each, and by Justices McReynolds and Sanford in three cases
each. Mr. Justice Van Devanter stood wholly aloof.
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judicial veto was tending to run rampant. This was the view of the
Supreme Court justice who from life and from books knew most about
judicial history. Less than two years before his retirement, Mr. Justice
Holmes told us in his dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri:"
"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety I feel at
the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting
down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the
decisions now stand I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating
of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for
any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was inblanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs
tended to give us carte
12
in its prohibitions."'
Such was the background of contemporary judicial history when at
the end of his first year in office President Hoover had two places on
the bench to fill. Only in the light of this background can one appreciate the unprecedented stir that the President's first two nominations
caused. If the Supreme Court was to continue to exercise an uncontrolled and well-nigh unlimited political function, the political agencies
of the government proposed to have a hand in choosing the persons in
whom this supreme political power was to be vested. The opposition of
the Senate was primarily a rebuke to the political behavior of the recent
majority of the Supreme Court. In my judgment it was a thoroughly
well-deserved rebuke, however unfortunately misdirected. Unhappily
the effective opportunity for rebuke requires that it be directed against
others than those who have created the need and demand for it. The debates in the Senate afforded an important popular education in jurisprudence. They emphasized the fact that final interpreters are lawgivers. If, as one may perhaps infer from some contrasting opinions
that have since been rendered, the particular victory of the Senate has
turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory, this but reinforces views already
expressed against putting confidence in any search for rubber stamps.
After the changes in the composition of the Court, the four Stalwarts began to find themselves more frequently in the minority. In the
next succeeding term they stood together in dissent from decisions sustaining a progressive chain-store tax' 8 and a regulation of the commissions payable to insurance agents' 4 and a decision condemning the
so-called Minnesota Gag Law.1 5 Mr. Justice McReynolds left his cus"281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. ed. 1056 (1930).
Id. at 595, 50 Sup. Ct. at 439, 74 L. ed. at 1061.

"Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. ed. 1248 (1931).
" O'Gorman v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130, 75 L. ed. 324

(1931).

I Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931).
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tomary companions to join in a decision 16 which restored the earlier
rule 17 that exempt income may be included in the measure of a corporate excise. The subsequent trend has been toward restricting the
tax exemptions of those who have relations with government' 8 instead
of expanding those exemptions as -was the practice of the later Taft
court. On issues of state jurisdiction to levy inheritance taxes, however, the new Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts have followed the
revolutionary precedents of the Taft r~gime. 19 There still keep coming year by year a fair crop of cases in which Justices Brandeis, Stone
and Cardozo are opposed to their six colleagues.2 0 When they add one
to their number, it is more likely to be the Chief Justice than Mr. Justice Roberts. 2 1 The most significant instance of this is the recent decision 22 condemning the Railroad Retirement Act.23 This is the first
of the decisions to which we must turn in a consideration of the problem
of national power over national affairs.
Here the majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Roberts, the
Mr. Justice Roberts who wrote the opinion sustaining the New York
statute regulating the price of milk2 4 and who joined with four col"Educational Films Co. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Shp. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 400
(1931).
"'Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389 (1911).
ISee Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 76 L. ed. 1010
(1932) ; Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. 304 (1931) ;
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 51 Sup. Ct. 273, 75 L. ed. 496 (1931) ; Denman
v. Slayton, 282 U. S. 514, 51 Sup. Ct. 269, 75 L. ed. 500 (1931) ; Burnet v. Jergins
Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 53 Sup. Ct. 439, 77 L. ed. 925 (1933) ; and Indian Ter. I. Oil
Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325, 53 Sup. Ct. 388, 77 L. ed. 812 (1933).
"See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98,
74 L. ed. 371 (1930) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. ed.
1056 (1930); and First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76
L. ed. 313 (1932).
2There were six instances during the last term of court and four during the
term before.
2I doubt if the statement in the text can be supported statistically, and the
instances are so few that a count would not be significant. The statement was
made in the light or the shadow of the Railway Pension Case, note 22 infra. The
only other important instance in which the Chief Justice was to the left and Mr.
Justice Roberts to the right is the dissent from decisions denying naturalization
to persons of limited readiness to bear arms. United States v. Macintosh, 283
U. S. 605, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 75 L. ed. 1302 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283
U. S. 636, 51 Sup. Ct. 569, 75 L. ed. 1319 (1931). These cases were decided
while Mr. Justice Holmes was on the bench, so that it is a mere assumption, though
a fairly safe one, that Mr. Justice Cardozo would have dissented.
Against these cases there are a few in which Mr. Justice Roberts was with the
justices to the left and Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was with those to the right.
Persons should not carelessly make statements like the one in the text now confessed to be questionable.
2 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct.
758, 79 L. ed. - (1935).
48 STAT. 1283, 45 U. S. C. A. §§201-14 (Supp. 1934).
-Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934).
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leagues to sustain the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law and the
action of the national government in calling in gold certificates 26 and in
abolishing the gold clause in private contractsY. He also joined in the
curious and as yet ununderstandable decision 28 to the effect that holders
of liberty bonds were not damaged by the mere fact that they were paid
in paper backed by a standard dollar of lesser gold content than that
specified in the bond, which specification the government had wrongfully and therefore unsudcessfully sought to alter, but which though
unaltered by the legislature somehow seemed to get altered by the Court.
This interesting phenomenon or non-phenomenon of "Now you see it,
now you don't" is aside from our immediate interest, but it affords insight into the process of constitutional interpretation and does not militate against the conclusion that the enterprise is one in which the views
of Supreme Court justices play a part.
Clear as is this conclusion to any one with a modicum of intelligence,
it is a conclusion that majority opinions are prone to deny or to conceal.
Thus in the Railway Pension Case,29 Mr. Justice Roberts, after outlining the provisions of the Railway Retirement Act, goes on to say:
"Our duty, like that of the court below, is fairly to construe the
powers of Congress, and to ascertain whether or not the enactment falls
within them, uninfluenced by predilection for or against the policy disclosed in the legislation. The fact that the compulsory scheme is novel
is, of course, no evidence of unconstitutionality. Even should we consider the Act unwise and prejudicial to both public and private interest,
if it be fairly within delegated power, our obligation is to sustain it.
On the other hand, though we should think the measure embodies a
valuable social plan and be in entire sympathy with its purpose and
beyond the boundaries of constiintended results, if its provisions go
30
tutional power we must so declare."
Behold these nine automatons, -with minds swept free of every human
frailty and every human preference, with no interest in the income of
carriers or the well-being of those whose hands are on the throttle and
whose eyes are on the track, with no notions of public policy, behold
them reading the* Constitution with some mechanical instruments of
vision and of understanding and finding there between the lines or beneath the words of 1787 and 1789 the answers to the questions of 1935!
"Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 78 L.
ed. 413 (1934).
Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S.317, 55 Sup. Ct. 428, 79 L. ed. - (1935).
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 294 U. S.240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 79
L. ed. - (1935).
Perry v. United States, 294 U. S.330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. -

(1935).

On the intricacies and the unsatisfactory reasoning of the opinion in this case

see, Hart, The Gold Clause in United States Bonds (1935) 48 H.Av.L. REv. 1057.

'Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., note 22 supra.
295 U. S. at 346, 55 Sup. Ct. at 761, 79 L. ed. at -.
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The conception is classic. The Delphic oracle has no monopoly of
hokum.
The words of 1789 were those of the Fifth Amendment with its requirement of due process of law. Mr. Justice Roberts tells how to find
their meaning when he says in a footnote:
"When the question is whether the legislative action transcends the limits of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, decision is
guided by the principle that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the end sought to be attained."3 1
"Decision shall be guided by the principle"--this smacks of the animism
of ideas and the inertness of the passive but receptive wearers of the
robe. But--"unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"-can this by any
stretch of credulity be thought to exclude "predilection for or against
the policy disclosed by the legislation"? The so-called principle has no
other measuring rod than the rod of fallible, human judgment. The
principle does not decide the case nor write the opinion. The decision
and the opinion are the products of fallible human judgment. Judicial
professions to the contrary, however commendable because of their apparent self-abnegation and modesty, are intentionally or unintentionally
but a mask of power; and he who is deceived thereby is not wise.
The Railroad Retirement Act had various provisions. All of the
Justices agreed that some of them were so unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious as to be subject to condemnation as wanting in due process
of law. On other provisions there was disagreement. Had the case
ended here, we should not at the moment be concerned with it. It did
not stop here, for the majority went on to declare that no compulsory
pension act for employees of interstate carriers would be a regulation
of interstate commerce. This means that, no matter how reasonable
and perfect a compulsory pension plan, the only power to impose one
on interstate carriers is the power of the several states. For such a
conclusion it is difficult to have a high degree of respect. It would be
far easier to respect the contrary conclusion that the application to interstate carriers of a compulsory pension plan is so serious and extensive a
regulation of interstate commerce that the power to impose it resides
only in Congress and not in the states. The only rational basis for the
judgment of the majority is an aversion to any legislative compulsion to
pay pensions. For such an aversion, the appropriate constitutional capsule is a judicial pronouncement of the denial of due process of law.
The Supreme Court reports contain many cases in which the commerce clause has been invoked as a basis for decisions influenced or
I Id. at 347-48, 55 Sup. Ct. at 762, 79 L. ed. at

-.
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dictated by judgments about the wisdom of the particular statute involved. Decisions on the scope of state power over or affecting interstate commerce could hardly be put into a rational pattern that excluded
the element of a comparison of the merits of freedom and restraint.
While the theory is that denial of state power is affirmation of exclusive national power, the fact often is that immunity from state power
32
This can
means practical immunity from national power as well.
hardly be obscured by the pretty metaphysic that Congress by its silence
about matters requiring uniformity of regulation has declared that they
shall be free from regulation. Notably in the field of taxation does
33
Congress fail to rush in where the states are forbidden to tread.
Judicially conferred freedom from a particular state regulation thus
often has the practical consequence of freedom from any similar national regulation. More obvious still is the practical fact that judicially
conferred freedom from national regulation may have the consequence
of freedom from all regulation.
This is all regrettably abstract and general and is likely to be comprehensible only to lawyers who by the nature of their calling inevitably
think in generals and in principles. For members of the bar who are
not lawyers, I should be more specific and concrete. It is inconceivable
that the states by separate action could establish a uniform, nation-wide
pension plan for the migratory employees of interstate carriers. In so
far as the plan was less than nation-wide, its spottiness might influence
the conduct of carriers to the detriment of the states with pension plans.
This in turn would influence those states to modify or abandon their
plans. Such practical considerations afford a sufficient reason why
questions of pay and pensions like questions of rates of interstate carriers3 4 should be answered by Congress rather than by the states. It is
See, for example, Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267,

71 L. ed. 524 (1927), which held unconstitutional under the commerce clause a

Pennsylvania statute requiring a license fee from persons, other than railroad or

steamship corporations, who sell or take orders for steamship tickets, and requir-

ing further a bond conditioned on due accounting for all moneys received. As
the minority pointed out, there were such agents who sold steamship tickets to the

impecunious and uneducated on the instalment plan and who had been found to

be guilty of practices from which their customers needed protection. It is hardly
conceivable that Congress will provide national regulation to take care of many
minor matters like this.
'This is not true as to taxes on imports from foreign countries, but I know
of no instances in which Congress has imposed special taxes on interstate trans-

portation and interstate sales to put on those enterprises burdens comparable to

those from which they are relieved by decisions denying state power to tax. With-

out such compensatory burdens, local enterprise, which the state must tax because
of the need for revenue, may be at a competitive disadvantage as compared with

interstate enterprise. This situation is one of increasing importance with the
spread of state sales taxes.
I See Houston, East &West Texas Railway Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 (1914) ; Railroad
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difficult to escape the conclusion that the real underlying reason why the
majority of the Court held that pay and pensions of employees of interstate carriers are not within the commerce power of Congress is that
this majority believes that such matters should be left to private bargaining and not arranged by legislatures at all. This, if not the purpose
of the decision, is pretty clearly destined to be the result.
There is nothing novel in this suggestion that issues of state versus
national regulation are often issues of some regulation or none. There
is nothing surprising in the fact that we all like national regulation that
we like, and hate national regulation that we hate. If I were not a guest,
I should confess that once upon an arid time in contrasting the attitudes
in certain localities toward national regulation of child labor and national regulation of intoxicating liquor I wrote that the sacred slogan of
states' rights is easily forgotten when employers wish their laborers sober
but unctuously invoked when they wish them young. Massachusetts
believes in a protective tariff, but not on raw materials. Many who
have howled against governmental regulation of industry have had no
fault to find with tariffs and subsidies. We talk in generals, but we
care about specifics. We can choose among competing generals to find
shelter for our preferred specifics. We believe in liberty but not in
license. Law should be stable, but it must not stand still. We must
follow logic, but not to a dryly logical extreme. The world is a world
of particulars, and whenever we talk in generals we are likely to say
more than we really mean.
We may talk at large about the necessity of a national power adequate to national needs or we may cry clarion calls to safeguard and
preserve unimpaired the reserved autonomy of the states, but we can
hardly think in such broad slogans. We cannot in wisdom make a single
question out of many different questions. From 1824 until 185185
Marshall and his successors fumbled with the question whether the
power of Congress over commerce is exclusive or concurrent and then
arrived at the wise conclusion that it is partly one and partly the other.
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct.
232, 66 L. ed. 371 (1922); New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct.
239, 66 L. ed. 385 (1922); and Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U. S. 427, 45 Sup. Ct.
.342, 69 L. ed. 696 (1925).
'See the uncertainties and diversities of opinion among many justices in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678 (U. S. 1827); Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
2 Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412 (U. S. 1829) ; Mayor, etc., of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet.
102, 9 L. ed. 648 (U. S. 1837) ; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449, 10 L. ed. 800
(U. S. 1841); License Cases, 5 How. 504, 12 L. ed. 256 (U. S. 1847); The
Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702 (U. S. 1848) ; and Cooley v. Board of
Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L. ed. 996 (U. S. 1851). In this last case, the
opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis announced a formula broad enough to permit all the
diversities of judgment of his predecessors and successors.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FEDERALISM
Ever since, year by year, the Court has been drawing the line, as it
must keep on drawing it, so long as states and nation continue to have
their partly independent orbits. No black-letter law can suw up the
cases unless it says that the states may regulate interstate commerce some
but not too much. The judicial formulas do not greatly help. What is
"national in character" and what is "local"? What "imperatively demands uniformity" and what "permits of diversity"? What "regulates" and what "merely incidentally affects??' What interferences
are "direct" and what are "indirect"? The answer comes not from the
categories but only from multitudinous cases.
Not long after his accession to the bench, Mr. Justice Stone pointed
out the meaninglessness of the formula on which the majority was content to rest a decision 36 that Pennsylvania may not regulate brokers who
sell steamship tickets on the instalment plan. He concurred in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis, but added in part:
"In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect
seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too
remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any
trustworthy formula by which it may be reached.
"It is difficult to say that such permitted interferences as those
enumerated in Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion are less direct than the interference prohibited here. But it seems clear that those interferences
not deemed forbidden are to be sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because a consideration of all the facts
and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the
character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of
commerce, lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests
peculiarly local and does not infringe the national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines." 37
Instead of a single mechanical formula, there are various practical factors to be taken account of in order to reach a practical judgment as to
whether on the whole it is wiser to permit the states to do what Congress
might do so long as Congress has not done it or wiser to leave persons
free to do what they please until Congress pleases to tell them what to
do or not to do.
No one who gets law from judicial behavior rather than from judicial remarks can have any doubt that Mr. Justice Stone points to the
actual process and results of decision. Florida may keep its green
c Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267, 71 L. ed. 524 (1927).

"Id. at 43, 47 Sup. Ct. at 271, 71 L. ed. at 530.
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lemons, but West Virginia may not keep its natural gas.3 0 Connecticut may keep its wild game,40 and New Jersey its water from run-ning streams,41 but Mississippi may not require the shucks of shrimps
to be removed before the shrimps go to market. 42 Once upon a time a
state might demand a license of an interstate ferry that wished to leave
its shore,4 3 but now such power is denied. 4 States may require interstate trains to stop at county seats 45 but it is not enough that the same
sized village has a poultry experiment station.4 6 The law of state power
over interstate commerce is a. welter of particulars. A license may be
required of one who puts up lightning rods ordered from without the
state47 but not of one who assembles ice-making machinery.4 8 The distinctions are not silly but sensible. The Supreme Court usually behaves
much better than it talks. One reason why it talks so badly is that the
justices are prone to pretend that the case is being decided by their
predecessors rather than by themselves and that it is not they that speak
but the Constitution that speaketh in them.
All these many things that the states may do to interstate commerce
are things that Congress may prevent the states from doing. The notion
that the spheres of state and of national power over commerce are independent and distinct was exploded by Marshall in 1824 and 1829.49
8s

Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59 L. ed. 835 (1915).

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L, ed.
1117 (1923). Neither may Oklahoma. See West v. Kansas Gas Co., 221 U. S.
229,31 Sup. Ct.564, 55 L. ed. 716 (1911).
, Geer v.Connecticut, 161 U. S.519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L.ed. 793 (1896). So
may Louisiana. See Lacoste v.Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 544, 44
Sup. Ct. 186, 68 L.ed. 437 (1924).
'7Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S.349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. ed. 828

(1908).

"Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S.1, 49 Sup. Ct. 1, 73 L. ed.
147 (1928). The text is in error in saying "Mississippi." It should have said
'touisiana." It was the custom to catch the shrimp in Louisiana and take them
over to Mississippi to be prepared for market. Louisiana wished to have the
processing done within her borders. Mr. Justice McReynolds, in dissenting,
thought that, as she might retain the shrimp for home consumption, she might
keep them long enough to give some employment to her people. His eight colleagues disagreed.
43 Conway v.Taylor's Executor, 1 Black 603, 17 L.ed. 191 (U.S.1862).
"Mayor of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U. S.676, 47 Sup. Ct. 758, 71 L.ed. 1292

(1927).

Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S.427, 17 Sup. Ct 627, 41 L. ed. 1064 (1897).
St Louis-S. F. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 261 U. S.369, 43 Sup.

Ct. 380, 67 L. ed. 701 (1923).

17Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S.16, 34 Sup. Ct. 578, 58 L. ed. 828 (1914).
"York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S.21, 38 Sup. Ct. 430, 62 L. ed. 963 (1918).
"Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S.1824), with Wilson
v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412 (U. S. 1829). Doubtless
'exploded" is much too strong a word to use in the text. Marshall, however, clearly
recognized that there are many things that states may do until Congress enters
upon the same field.
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States could regulate bridges over navigable streams50 until Congress
took the matter in hand. 51 States could require posting of interstate
rates and adherence to posted rates 52 until Congress took the subject
over. 55 State tort law applied to injuries to employees while engaged
in interstate commerce 4 until we had the federal Employer's Liability
Law. 55 Failure to deliver interstate messages and shipments of goods
was subject to appropriate state law 56 until Congress acted. 57 Where
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. 96 (U. S. 1866).
" See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 51
L. ed. 523 (1906).
1 Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 21 L. ed. 710 (U. S.

1873).

Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley & Lewis, 158 U S. 98, 15 Sup. Ct. 802, 39
L. ed. 910 (1895).
I can recall no cases in which the contrary was contended. Had attorneys
thought there were any objections that could be premised on the commerce clause,
they would have been likely to urge them -in some of the following cases: Missouri
P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161, 32 L. ed. 107 (1888) ; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 8 Sup. 1176, 32 L. ed. 109
(1888) ; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. ed.
772 (1893) ; Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209, 15 Sup. Ct. 585,
39 L. ed. 695 (1895) ; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 175 U. S. 348, 20 Sup. Ct.
136, 44 L. ed. 192 (1899) ; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 26 Sup. Ct.
159, 50 L. ed. 322 (1905). When after the Employers' Liability Act there was
denial of the application of state law, the reason was exclusively that Congress had
taken the matter over. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702,
33 Sup. Ct. 703, 57 L. ed. 1031 (1913) ; New York Central Railroad v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. ed. 1045 (1917) ; Erie Railroad Co. v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. 556, 61 L. ed. 1057 (1917). It would have been unthinkable that such injuries in the course of interstate commerce should be subject to
no law at all, and the only federal law available was one derived from those
general principles that federal courts may discover for themselves in matters of
general jurisprudence as a guide to their action in cases properly within their jurisdiction. To avoid any such vacuum as would at one time have resulted from the
inapplicability of state law to discrimination in charges for interstate service, Mr.
Justice Brewer by invoking some questionable jurisprudence reached a wise result
in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct.
561, 45 L. ed. 765 (1901).
" See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed.

327 (1912).
" There

was always the question as to what is the appropriate state law in order
to avoid the extraterritorial application of state statutes. On state regulation of
interstate telegraph messages, see among many cases the following: Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406, 31 Sup. Ct. 59,
54 L. ed. 1088 (1910) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, 31
Sup. Ct. 399, 55 L. ed. 498 (1911); and Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown,
234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. ed. 1457 (1914). For corresponding cases
on state regulation of liability for non-delivery of freight, see Chicago, M. & St.
P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, 42 L. ed. 688 (1898) ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. ed. 268 (1903) ;
and Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 34 Sup. Ct. 790, 58 L. ed.
1377 (1914). This last case allowed a state court to apply a state statute to award
an attorney's fee in an action under the Carmack Amendment.
Postal Telegraph Co. v. Warren-Goodwin Lumber Co., 251 U. S. 27, 40 Sup.
Ct. 69 L. ed. 118 (1919); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Boegli, 251 U. S. 315,
40 Sup. Ct. 167, 64 L. ed. 281 (1920) ; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S.
491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. ed. 314 (1913). The first two cases involve telegraph
messages. Congress had said nothing about non-delivery of messages or liability
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states were not allowed by the Court to regulate, 58 Congress might permit them to do so. 59 Intoxicating liquor has mellowed the stiffness of
constitutional law. Always in between the exclusive baili-wicks of state
power and of national power there has been a large common because of
vicinage. The law is not only a mosaic; it is also a kaleidoscope. Any
notion that in that hot Philadelphia summer of 1787 the Fathers froze
forever a rigid framework of government is wide of the mark.
Very early Hamilton with Marshall's sanction pushed national power
beyond what Jefferson and Madison thought were the boundaries nominated in the bond. Jefferson and Madison in their days of power
yielded constitutional doubts to practical exigencies. Be it remembered
that the words of the commerce clause and of the Tenth Amendment fix
no limit to national power. They merely assert that there is a limit. The
necessary and proper clause allows any expansion that judges think is
justified. The adjectives themselves point to circumstances as a guide
to judgment. judgment must depend upon some combination of views
of necessity and desirability and some general notion of what is too great
and too sudden a stretch of ancient anticipations to be sanctioned without taking the sense of that composite legal sovereign that wields the
formal amending power.
Thus we conclude our introduction and come at last to the Schechter
Case"0 with its unanimous judgment that Congress itself could not indulge in any such sweeping control of local matters as was attempted by
the Codes under the National Industrial Recovery Act.60 I am not disposed to criticise the result of the decision. Indeed I am rather precluded from doing so by what I wrote about the Railway Pension Case
shortly before the Schechter decision came down. In a paper read at
therefor. It had merely provided that the companies might vary their rates as to
repeated and unrepeated messages. This, said the Court, indicated a purpose to
subject interstate telegraph companies to a uniform national rule, and to exclude

the possibility of applying varying state laws. Thus the state-imposed penalties
failed because state law could no longer apply. For the proper rule of damages,
the Supreme Court looked to those principles of general jurisprudence which it

can discover when necessary. Some would say that this means that the suit was
settled according to federal common law, but this analysis may be not yet wholly

orthodox. The third case, supra, involved the shipment of goods, and a state
statute was held to be inapplicable because of the Carmack Amendment to the
Hepburn Act of 1906. Here also the Supreme Court had to discover for itself
the rule of liability, since Congress had not thought about it.
Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 31 L. ed.
700 (1888) ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. ed. 128 (1890).
'ln re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891), sustaining
the Wilson Act, and Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S.

311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917), sustaining the Webb-Kenyon Act.
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 496, 55 Sup. Ct.
837, 79 L.ed.- (1935).
a48 STAT. 195, 196 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §703 (Supp. 1934).
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Philadelphia to neighbors of Mr. Justice Roberts, 62 I referred to the
dissenting view of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis,
Stone and Cardozo and concluded by saying:
"Itis the attitude of men who for many years have been widely acclaimed. In voting, their strength is as the strength of four. In power
of thought and in quality of wisdom, it is not so limited. I should think
that any man of intelligence
and large capacity would be proud to be
'63
numbered among them."
This rather pleased me at the moment as a gentle way of chiding Mr.
Justice Roberts in his own home town, and I did not anticipate how
soon I might be hoist by my own petard. I regretfully conclude that
there was wisdom in what I said and that therefore it must be granted
that the unanimity of the judgment in the Sclwchter Case commands, if
it does not compel, respect.
The decision on its particular facts was in some respects a narrow
one. The Schechters acted only after interstate commerce was over and
their sales were wholly local. The effect of their local practices on the
previous interstate commerce in chickens or on future interstate commerce in chickens was not demonstrably great. Their violation of the
code provisions as to wages and hours operated on interstate commerce
through reduction of price and reduction of the purchasing power of
their employees and of those whom they might have employed had their
employees worked fewer hours per week. Promotion of interstate dommerce by increase of the price of commodities is far from certain in its
operation. If interstate commerce was promoted by increasing the buying power of the Schechter Shochtim, it would be promoted equally by
increasing the buying power of any or every one else. To the buying
power argument, there pretty clearly is no stopping place. Moreover,
you do not necessarily increase total buying power by increasing the
buying power of some. All the economics of the buying power argument is disputable, quite possibly too disputable to have one view accepted by a court as a sufficient reason for turning us all at once into a
well-nigh unitary rather than a federal system of government.
The suddenness and expansiveness of the national regulation of
hours and wages and trade practices in numerous types of business were
very different from the creep-mouse, crawl-mouse way in which Congress had previously dealt with special local matters that affect interstate commerce. From cases sanctioning previous Congressional control over intrinsically local commerce it was easy enough to spin a verbal
chain of reasoning that would condone the wide reach of the Recovery
The Constitution and Social Security (1935)

clId. at 158.

181 ANNALs 149.
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Act. I know how easy it was, because in an early moment of enthusiasm I spun such a chain myself. 64 I knew from the beginning there
must be a stopping point somewhere, and the barbers and cleaners and
dyers seemed rather remote. Clearly the Schechter Case was a much
weaker one for the government than the Belcher Case 5 would have been.
If the government wished to delay the judicial test until it could put its
worst foot forward, it succeeded admirably. If it wished to delay the
judicial test until rosy hopes had somewhat faltered and faded, it succeeded also. The Schechter Case has left hardly a ripple as compared
with what would have been an enormous splash had the Supreme Court
clipped the eagle's wings when it first began to scream.
While we are compelled to concur in the judgment of a unanimous
court, we do not have to entertain unqualified admiration for the opinion of the Chief Justice in support of the decision. As technical lawyers
we may regret that he did not confine himself closely to the precise case
before him. Indeed, as really technical lawyers, we may regret that the
court went into the commerce question at all, since the Recovery Act
had already been killed by the opinion on the point of delegation. Hereafter, no member of the court can rightly criticise a majority for deciding great constitutional issues when the decision is not necessary for
the disposition of the case at bar. The Chief Justice has weakened his
own lament in the Railway Pension Case0 6 that the majority there indulged in the superfluous. Judicial professions and judicial practice are
not in universal accord. Whatever the Constitution may command as to
the absence of national power over local commerce, it does not command
the Supreme Court to condemn a hypothetical Act of Congress in addiThe Scope of the Commerce Power, in EssAYs ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION (a volume in honor of Frank Johnson Goodnow) (1935) 197.

'United States v. Belcher. I have not been able to find the report of this case
decided in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on October

31, 1934. In the preliminary print of the official advance sheets of the Supreme
Court Reports, Vol. 204, No. 1, at page viii at the end of the pamphlet is the stateMotion of appellant
ment: "April 1, 1935. No." 628. United States v. Belcher ....
to dismiss the appeal and that mandate issue forthwith granted." In the brief for
the defendants in the Schechter Case, there is at page 84 a list of 17 cases in lower
ceurts in which the Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional, none of which
bad reached the Supreme Court for hearing. It was stated that, "although many
opportunities have been afforded the Government to have the validity of the Recovery Act determined in this Court, it has yet to bring a case thereon to argument
in this Court, and private individuals have been unable to do so either because the

Administration has not seen fit to enforce orders of its various Boards or because
of the Government's failure to effect review of adverse court decisions." The
Belcher Case and a number of others involved manufacturers who ship their
products across state lines.
I Note 29 supra. 295 U. S. at 375, 55 Sup. Ct. at 773, 79 L. ed. at -.
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tion to the one involved in the case. Such conduct gives no comfort to
the orthodox who dislike the terms "judicial government" and "judicial
veto."
In the Circuit Court of Appeals it was necessary for the majority to
declare themselves on the commerce question, for the decision there was
unanimous that there had been no undue delegation of legislative power
and no violation of the standards of due process. 6 ' This unanimity suggests that the Constitution did not inexorably condemn the scope of
choice left by Congress to the President. On the commerce question
the Circuit Judges were unanimous, too, in sanctioning national power
over the selling practices of the Schechters. *On this point, also, the
constitutional command cannot be inexorable. Judge Manton would
have sustained the indictment with respect to wages and hours. For
himself and Judge Chase, Judge Learned Hand differed. He approached the problem as one of human judgment, as a question of more
or less, when he declared:
"In an industrial society bound together by means of transport and
communication as rapid and certain as ours, it is idle to seek for any
transaction, however apparently isolated, which may not have an effect
elsewhere; such a society is an elastic medium which transmits all
tremors throughout its territory; the only question is of their size."'68
And similarly, after reviewing cases sanctioning national power, he
added:
"It would be, I think, disingenuous to pretend that the ratio decidendi
of such decisions is susceptible of statement in general principles. That
no doubt might give a show of necessity to the conclusion, but it would
be insincere and illusory, and appears formidable only in case the conclusion is surreptitiously introduced during the reasoning. The truth
really is that where the border shall be fixed is a question of degree,
dependent upon the consequences in each case." 69
Degree and consequence do not themselves decide cases. They
merely afford data for consideration by human beings who decide cases.
In the Supreme Court, however, the Chief Justice was more acute than
Judge Hand and was able to sum up the precedents in a formula. The
cases, he finds, establish that Congress may regulate intrastate transactions that affect interstate commerce directly but may not regulate those
intrastate transactions that affect interstate commerce only indirectly.
Otherwise Congress might regulate substantially all intrastate transac9 United States v. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F (2d) 617 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935).

"Id. at 624.

'Id. at 625.
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tions and there would be an end of state autonomy. All that remained
to reach a decision was the minor premise. This was found in the assertion that the practices of the Schechters affected interstate commerce
only indirectly. The Q. E. D. was thus practically automatic. We are
left to discover for ourselves why and wherein the Schechters affected
interstate commerce only indirectly and whether others differently situated would affect that commerce directly or indirectly. We are told
that "the precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise, but
the distinction is clear in principle. 70o Clear in principle but not enlightening with respect to application.
By insisting that the arguments of the government could not be
accepted without sanctioning a completely centralized system, the decision was made easy and inevitable. The opinion has more of the flavor
of umpiring a debate than of analyzing a problem. It says about as
little as possible beyond affirming that there remains to the states under
the Constitution a reserved sphere of autonomy over local production
and distribution, notwithstanding economic crises and notwithstanding
economic advantages or disadvantages of a centralized system. To say
that the opinion is rationally inadequate is not to say that it is without
wisdom. Had it analyzed rather than asserted, it would itself be more
open to analysis and would more clearly reveal the nature of the judgment exercised. Paradoxically enough, had the opinion been narrower,
it might have been broader. Specific and concrete differentiation and
reasoning might cover more cases that are likely to arise than does a
broad assertion that Congress may not order the whole of local commerce. By closing only the big door to the cat, the opinion may leave
open many little doors for the kittens.
It is not easy to tell just what small doors are closed. The decision
itself of course settles that local merchants are not subject to Congressional regulation of prices and practices and wages. The opinion precludes general national labor regulation if the only argument in support
is that states cannot have high labor standards if their local and extrastate markets are subject to competition from .states with low labor
standards. It does not preclude national labor regulations of enterprises
that compete -with each other in interstate commerce, leaving those free
who confine themselves to local commerce. Though the opinion does
not preclude such more restricted national regulation, it lends no comfort to it. Part of the opinion talks about "all the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost' ' 71 without indicating that it is
'o295 U. S. at 546, 55 Sup. Ct. at 850, 79 L. ed. at
I Id. at 549, 55 Sup. Ct. at 851, 79 L. ed. at -.

-.
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confining itself to production not followed by interstate commerce. Coal
mining, for example, is a prelude to interstate commerce, whereas the
Schechter chicken-killing and selling enterprise was a postlude. Would
the difference make a difference? The opinion does not say. The Chief
Justice certainly could have told us had he wished us to know. Here is
a door, and not a very small one, that is still not officially closed.
The most that is left to Congress by the decision is a power to set up
compulsory standards of fair competition for producers and manufacturers who make interstate sales. I say "standards of fair competition,"
because that is the phrase that is going around. What one should say is
"standards of fair non-competition." What national manufacturers are
after is to prevent methods of competition that glut the market and that
enable low-cost producers or producers content with small profits to capture the market or most of it for themselves. What labor leaders are
after is to compel all competitors to maintain a standard scale of wages
so that no competitor or group of competitors who can get labor at low
wages can depress the wage scale generally. National manufacturers to
a considerable degree seem ready to accept standardized wages as the
price of securing standardized modes and scales of production and distribution. Not that this desire is universal among them. It is stronger
with those who cannot get cheap labor than with those who can. It is
stronger with northern textile mills than with southern. In some other
enterprises, it is stronger with the strong than with the weak, stronger
with the big than with the little.
The Sherman Act,72 the Clayton Act 7 3 and the Trade Commission
Act 7 4 prevent the strong and the big in various ways from taking advantage of their power and size: This is irksome generally and particularly
when in time of depression bigness is at a disadvantage because of its
inevitable overhead and relative inflexibility. Then the big look at the
little and like to call them chiselers. The shirt manufacturer who can
get stitchers at two dollars a week and get mail orders and ship by
parcel post is a boon to his particular customers. It is not so certain that
he is a boon to the nation. His two-dollar stitchers are not good customers for the shoemakers. Beyond the individual manufacturers and
their individual employees there are the other producers and the other
workers. In these days of large-scale industry the recipients of interest
and dividends cannot by their purchases keep the factories, going. It is
the pay envelopes of the masses that make possible the pay envelopes of
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §1 (1927).
'38
STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §12 (1927).
1138 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927).
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the masses. It is these pay envelopes that make possible tfie payment of
interest and dividends on bonds and stocks. There are reasons why
industrialists generally must desire the general wide distribution of good
wages. There are reasons why we all must desire well-being and comfort for all if we know how to get it without too much sacrifice of other
things we desire more and think we can get.
Some such mixture of individualistic and collectivistic hopes lay
back of the National Recovery Act. How far they came to fruition
under the codes and their administration is a matter of dispute. The
dispute will not be settled by the contemporary competing rhetoric and
it can hardly be settled by statistics until we are able to get statistics of
what would have happened if what did happen hadn't happened and
something else had. Fortunately or unfortunately there is no supreme
bench of economic theorists to give us decisions that make the authoritative economic law as a supreme bench of judges can give decisions
that make the constitutional law that is the law because they themselves
embody the law. The constitutional law is that we cannot without
change of the Constitution have any such large-scale planning of industry as was attempted. All that remains possible at the moment is some
smaller-scale planning that at most can extend to the industries that sell
their products across state lines. Even as to this there are grave doubts
whether the Supreme Court would so read the Constitution as to find
therein the requisite national power.
In weighing the outlook for the future, one must of course not bank
too heavily upon the approach of a single opinion. It may be that we
should have had a very different opinion in the Sclwchter Case had the
Chief Justice assigned the task of writing it to one of his colleagues
rather than to himself. The tone of much of our contemporary constitutional law may be more an individual than a collective one, due to the
fact that the Chief Justice assumes the burden of being the spokesman
in most of the major cases. There are judges to right of him and judges
to left of him who may volley and thunder and reason why in ways
somewhat different from his. Yet when the issue is one between regulation and freedom we know how the judges to right of him are likely
to volley and thunder, so that if he seems to be inclined against regulation we can be pretty confident that the contemporary court will be in
favor of freedom.
The cases which would most nearly sanction national power over
processes of production for extra-state markets are those which applied
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the Sherman Act to a strike in a mine7 and to a corner in cotton.
These cases were not so pertinent to the Schechter situation. There is
a possible indication in the opinion of the Chief justice that he regards
the Sherman Act cases as no precedent for legislation that curbs competition rather than compels it. He says that "our growth and development have called for wide use of the commerce power of the federal
government in its control over the expanded activities of interstate commerce and in protecting that commerce from burdens, interferences, and
'' 7
conspiracies to restrain and monopolize it."
If people outside of commerce interfere with commerce, burden it, or restrain it, they can be
dealt with by Congress. It does not follow that Congress may compel
people outside of commerce to act together to regularize commerce
rather than to act separately in order to leave commerce free. It is
always precarious to assume a negative pregnant in a statement of what
can be done, but we can still be quite certain that legislation forbidding
competition will have a harder time with a court than legislation commanding it.
In addition to the commerce question and interwoven with it is the
due-process question. The due-process issue was not considered in the
Schechter Cose. The Poultry Code had been killed twice and it could
not be revived or given further needful repose by extracting the mystery
of the Fifth Amendment. This Amendment, however, must be satisfied
by any legislation otherwise within Congressional power. So we have
to face the question whether regulation of hours and wages normally
obnoxious to the judicial canons of due-process 78 can find sufficient say5

I Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551,
69 L. ed. 963 (1925). This is known familiarly as the Second Coronado Case, in
contradistinction to the First Coronado Case, which is United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. ed. 975 (1922), which was
the first appeal in the same action. On the first appeal the Supreme Court reversed
a judgment against striking defendants, on the ground that there was no evidence
of an intent to affect interstate commerce. On the second trial new evidence was
offered to meet the deficiencies pointed out by the Supreme Court. The trial court,
on the strength of the prior decision, directed a verdict for the defendants. On
appeal, this was reversed by the Supreme Court's ruling that there was enough
evidence of the requisite intent to send the case to the jury. The new evidence on
the second trial was largely confined to reports that speakers at meetings, in
exhorting the strikers to keep up the fight, pointed out that loss of the union scale
in their mine would result in loss of the scale in competing mines in other states
and thereby affect adversely the workers' interests over a wide area. This was
of course a patent economic fact, but the hortatory mention of it at a rally seems
a slim ground for spelling out an intent to affect interstate commerce, when the
quarrel in origin and in immediate aim was confined to the -parpicular mine.
'United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 141, 57 L. ed. 333 (1913).
295 U. S. at 549, 55 Sup. Ct. at 851, 79 L. ed. at -.
8 The following statement in the brief for the Schechters may be accepted as a
fair statement of the law of the past, though an inadequate presentation of the
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ing grace in the fact that it is imposed as part of a plan for creating
fair non-competition. It does not seem fanciful to hazard the surmise
that such a justification must have behind it a much greater strength of
public opinion than any now prevailing before it will become congenial
to a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Without provisions as to wages and hours of labor, no codes of fair
non-competition are likely to be politically possible or economically wise.
On the whole, the outlook for restricting the Schwchter Case to its own
particular facts is far from bright.
Of course the major basis of the Schechter Case would not be available as a sufficient reason for condemning Congressional regulation of
an enterprise that ships its products across state lines. It could not be
said that the sanction of such an exertion of national authority would
"destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself establishes,
between commerce 'among the several states' and the internal concerns
of a state."' 79 Yet it will still be open to the Court to assert that the
conditions of production prior to the shipment affect the shipment only
indirectly. The majority which could so narrowly define "regulation
of interstate commerce" in the Railway Pension Case8o could readily
new justifications that might be adduced in favor of the wages and hours prescriptions of the Codes:
"It can not be denied that, if the past decisions of this Court still mean what
they say, not even Congress (much less its delegates) has constitutional authority
to fix minimum wages for purely private businesses, even when the declared purpose is protection of health and morals, and even when the regulation is restricted
to women and children and to a field in which Congress has the unquestioned power
of control. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525. It can not be denied
that the decisions of this Court with respect to maximum hours of labor go no
further than to say that a legislature may restrict the hours of labor in limited
situations to 8, 9 or 10 hours, and that the constitutionality of this restriction is
definitely predicated solely upon a health relationship.
"The Recovery Act throws overboard all these 'old fashioned' limitations; it
does not even restrict minimum wages to women or children; it does not restrict
them to particular industrial applications; it takes no account of the health or
morals factors. In its administration it is common knowledge that this bold attempt to dictate has spread out into every conceivable trade, industry, business or
occupation, whether interstate or intrastate, even to barber shops and clothes
pressing establishments. In the case of maximum hours of labor not the slightest
attempt has been made in the statute, or in its administration, to relate the fixing
of maximum hours to individual health. No consideration has been paid to the
question whether or not the -public has any real interest in the businesses, trades,
occupations or industries regulated. The regimentation has been all pervasive and
all inclusive, and liberty of contract has been utterly ignored.
"It must be admitted that even in the case of public utilities having monopolistic
privileges, such as the railroads, the electric and gas companies, etc., any power to
fix minimum wages has been recognized only once by this Court, and then only as
a purely temporary measure to tide over a special and limited situation. Wilson v.
New, 243 U. S. 332. It is now proposed to discard all limitations under the theory
of a general emergency, and to relate the fixing merely to the vague concept of
public welfare" (295 U. S. at 502-503).
"295 U. S. at 550, 55 Sup. at 852, 79 L. ed. at -.
wNote 22 supra.
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declare that Congress must keep hands off the process of production. It
could readily so restrict- the National Labor Relations Act81 that it
would achieve little or nothing of its purpose. That Act defines "affecting interstate commerce" as "incommerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce," 82 and thus invokes the authority of the precedents sanctioning the application of the Sherman Act to
labor controversies, but the Court could say that those cases ate authority
only where there is a proven intent to affect interstate commerce, and
thus again turn a canon of statutory interpretation into a restriction on
constitutional power.
Unlike the National Recovery Act, the National Labor Relations
Act deals with situations with which the states may deal as effectively if
they will. So however did the Sherman Act when it was applied to a
strike in a mine. A particular state may of course think.that it has a
self-interest in not encouraging collective bargaining. It may hope to
make itself a Mecca for industrial enterprise, as states without inheritance
taxes have sought to be Meccas for millionaires morituris. Whether
the self interest is that of the state or of selected individuals is another
question. Obviously one big reason for the movement to secure national regulation of labor relations is that it is easier to convince one
legislature than forty-eight. The concern is not dominantly commercial
even though there is the element of equalizing one factor of competition
among producers for the national market. Much more dominantly commercial is a plan to regularize production and distribution of the fruits
of the earth like coal and oil. Here individual states are well nigh help-'
less to do separately what pretty clearly needs to be done. They may cooperate by reciprocal legislation or by interstate compacts, but the possibility of this is not incontrovertibly a sufficient reason for finding rio
need for direct national action.
However much the Supreme Court may allow Congress to regulate
natural resources or production for extra-state markets, the ban of the
Schechter Case prevents any thoroughgoing ventures into a planned national economy. As a consequence, there is destined to be wide public
discussion of whether we want to amend the Constitution in order to
endow Congress with wider powers than the Supreme Court has accorded to it. The slogan "Back to the Constitution" is not enlightening,
and the slogan "A National Power Adequate to National Needs" is not
particularly informing. The issues underlying the conflict between the
two slogans are not ones in which lawyers as lawyers have any especial
expert competence. Not being competent, I may therefore emulate
- 29 U. S. C. A.§151 (1935). Public-No. 198-74th Congress.
DId. §2, par. 7, 29 U. S. C. A. §152 (7) (1935).
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others similarly situated and discuss the subject freely. Of course as a
constitutional lawyer, I can say that Congress would not be compelled
to exercise wide powers even though such powers are accorded to it.
Had the National Recovery Act been held constitutional, Congress might
have repealed it and left matters where they were before and where the
Supreme Court has now put them. Whether Congress should have power
and whether Congress should use power are two different questions.
Architecturally we have an antiquated frame of government when
we lack nation-wide power to deal with nation-wide conditions that can
not be dealt with effectively by the several states. It is abundantly clear
that the states could not do much to revive agriculture and industry. If
it were clear that the nation by national regulation could do a lot to
revive and maintain agriculture and industry, it would then be clear that
the nation ought to have the power to do it. An objection to the possession of national power for national planning must come down to a confidence in laissez faire as the only worth-while national physician or else
be founded upon so confirmed a lack of confidence in the capacity of
prospective national legislators and executives and administrators that
their ministrations are more to be feared than the disease. I am neither
a prophet nor the son of a prophet and I do not know that congressional
and presidential incompetence are so certain that I would unqualifiedly
put my trust in other gods or in none. I am not an economist and I do
not know that the only way to right things is to leave them alone. As
an observer I have a suspicion that some things should be tinkered with
and some should be left alone. As an observer I suspect also that tinkering in response to political pressure is not certain to be the best sort of
tinkering.
Though not an economist, I can sometimes tell the difference between
hard and sensible thinking and hot air. One of the economists in whom
I have most confidence believes that the better way out of the depth of
a depression is by rapid change in production, and that rapid change is
more fostered by low wages and prices than by high wages and prices.8 3
' See Slichter, The Government as an Economic Manager (June, 1935) 16
PRoc. ACAD. PoL. Sci., No. 3, p. 119; and Implications of the Shorter Hour Movement (January, 1934) 15 id., No. 4, p. 63. Mr. Slichter's views gain weight from
the fact that his human interest in the welfare of labor does not inspire him to chase
will o' the wisps or to focus on what may seem immediate gains to the neglect of
an adequate appraisal of underlying factors of a more permanent character. Needless to say, also, he is not one of those simple minded persons who pin their hope
of economic heaven on letting so-called Nature take its course.
For a different attitude toward wages, see DicxmsoN, HOLD FAST THE MIDDLE
WAY, Chapter V. Mr. Dickinson believes that the conceded general disadvantages
from low wages may at times be so great that for a period, to a degree, in various
enterprises, it is important to use the legislative power to lift wages higher than
tree bargaining would put them. Short-run considerations may sometimes be so
vital that we should make some compromise between them and long-run consid-
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'This is not likely to be the goal of political pressure. Yet political pressure may work in various ways its follies to perform, and we can hardly
withhold political power because there must be political pressure behind
its exercise. The absence of political power is not the absence of all
-power. Economic pressure may work as unwisely as political pressure.
Legislatures are not certain to be foolish and certainly are not certain
to be more foolish than many others. For many years there has been
,enough sporadic economic folly from majorities of the Supreme Court
,of the United States to make us not too confident about perpetuating
our present verbal partition of power between the states and the nation,
when these wide-open words permit such judicial majorities to use their
conscious or unconscious economic notions to stop national efforts to
make things better than they otherwise might be. We have had two
years of now forbidden national action, and God still reigns and the
Government at Washington still lives.
Unless the majority of the Supreme Court behaves with extraordinary recalcitrancy in the next few years, I do not anticipate much
headway to any movement to amend the Constitution in the direction
of a more consolidated government. On the whole it may be well to
be patient and not bite off more than we can chew. While much nonsense is talked about bureaucracy, there certainly is a limit to what an
administrative organization can handle competently. Those of us who
recall when dry days were not so dry would not be surprised to learn
that not all the violations of the codes got into the courts. Uniformity
of law does not necessarily mean uniformity of conduct. The government of the nation has still enough on hand to keep it busy for years
to come. It may, indeed, before long if not already be grateful for the
loss of the load that the Court has lifted from its back. With lessened
functions, it may perform better the functions that remain. These
functions are more confined to special problems which may be not beyond the possibility of wise and effective grasp. Out of the experience
born of the national administration of what is surely destined to be under
national care, we may hope for wisdom in deciding whether to make
ourselves more of a nation than the Supreme Court is able to discover
that we have become.
erations. I do not know to what extent Mr. Slichter would agree or disagree with
Mr. Dickinson.

